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NOTES AND COMMENT
VETERANS' SUPER-SENIORITY RIGHTS
Whether the interests of the veterans of this war will be pro-
tected in the judicial construction of the Selective Service and Train-
ing Act ' is a post-war question of vital interest. It is thus necessary
to ascertain whether the attitude of the courts will be liberal in order
to enable more veterans to take advantage of the Act which provides
a one-year guarantee of holding their jobs over non-veterans.
From the few cases thus far decided it can be elicited that despite
opposition on the part of labor unions and management, the courts
are construing the statute with a beneficent eye toward the veteran
and according him "super-seniority". 2
In enacting Section 8, Congress could have profitably under-
taken considerably more research, although in all justice to Congress
154 STAT. 890, 50 U. S. C. A. 308 (1940). Section 8(b) : In the case of
any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left
or leaves a position, other than a temporary position in the employ of any
employer and who (1) receives such certificate [indicating satisfactory com-
pletion of service under Section 3(b) of the Act]; (2) is still qualified to
perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemploy-
ment within 40 days after he is relieved from such training and service...
(amended and extended to 90 days after discharge from the armed forces or
release from the hospital, provided such hospitalization has not been for more
than one year). See Pub. L. No. 473, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 8, 1944).
Section 8(b) (B) : If such position was in the employ of a private em-
ployer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a posi-
tion of like seniority, status and pay unless the employer's circumstances
have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so .
Section 8(c): Any person who is restored to a position . . shall be
considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period
of training and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored with-
out loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other bene-
fits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices re-
lating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer
at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be dis-
charged from such position without cause within one year after restoration.
Section 8(b) (A) extends this protection to employees of the Federal
Government. Section 8(b) (C), to State and local government employees but
the compulsory provisions do not apply to them. The Service Extension Act
of 1941 [55 Stat. 627 (1941), 50 U. S. C. A. §357 (Supp. III, 1941-43)]
extends these benefits to those inductees or volunteers who enter into active
duty after May 1, 1940. Members of the Merchant Marine are also covered
by similar provisions provided they can show substantially continuous service
in the Merchant Marine. The Civilian Reemployment of Members of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1943 [57 Stat. 162, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1472 (1943)
(Supp. III, 1941-43)].
2 "Super-Seniority" is a term applied to the veteran's rights under the
code. It gives the false impression of overriding the seniority rights of others
and is so commonly understood by the bar and laity. Actually, seniority has
no relevance to this veteran's right, which is in the nature of a statutory
preference of retention of employment for one year. The term "absolute
priority" has also been colloquially used in reference to such preference.
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it must be remembered that at the time of the passage of the Selec-
tive Service and Training Act a more immediate and pressing prob-
lem was the raising of a protective army of conscripts in a warring
world.3  Such further research would have facilitated the develop-
ment of procedures more advantageous to the returning veteran.
Nevertheless, the intent of Congress was that the veteran should
have the right to be restored to the job he held when he was inducted
under the provisions of the Selective Service and Training Act and
to hold that job for a period of one year regardless of his relative
seniority to a non-veteran performing the same type of work and
possessing the same or similar qualifications, provided of course that
such job was still in existence. It could not have been the purpose
of Congress merely to give him the right upon discharge from the
armed forces to have his name placed upon a roster with the privi-
lege of going to work only when and if his name should be reached
and his old job be available. The much-debated Memorandum 190-A
issued by Selective Service Headquarters is in line with the fore-
going reasoning. This memorandum declared that, "A veteran who
has been reinstated to his former position cannot within one year be
displaced by another on the ground that the latter has greater senior-
ity rights. To permit such displacement would be to nullify the
original reinstatement and thus deprive the veteran of his reemploy-
ment rights under the act, and would be, in effect, a repeal of an
act of Congress." 4
The question of constitutionality has been raised by those op-
posed to such a construction, i.e., whether the provisions r covering
reemployment of servicemen constitute a valid exercise of the war
power. In response to this query it can be stated categorically that
the "war power" 6 is not restricted to the winning of victories.
In Hall v. The Union Light, Heat and Power Company,7 it was
held that the public statutes dealing with the welfare of the people
are to have a liberal construction and that the contention that the
statute violates the "due process" provision of the Fifth Amendment
was without merit. Moreover, since Congressional power to legis-
late for the public welfare is superior to the rights of contract of
3 For history of legislative intent, see 76TH CoNG. REc. 10107, 10487, 11697
(1940).
4 Selective Service Headquarters Memorandum 190-A, pt. IV, par. 4(b)
(May 20, 1944).
5 Supra note 1.
6 "The war power of the national government is the power to wage war
successfully.... It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as
substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted
to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemies. It embraces
every phase of the national defense. . . ." Hirabayashi v% United States,
320 U. S. 81, 87 L. ed. 1774 (1943). Also see Hall v. Union Light, Heat and
Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
7 Cited supra note 6.
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private parties, there is more than ample precedent to sustain consti-
tutionality when such issue is raised.8
The unions and management have brought forth rather gloomy
predictions concerning the effect "absolute priority" will have on their
interests and the welfare of the country at'large. The unions fear
that if the veterans are given a one-year guarantee of job tenure
outside of the union fold, it will destroy the basic system of job se-
curity rights of their members, and thus in turn be a detriment to
the veteran himself after this year expires. There is also the appre-
hension that this one-year immunity will bring elements less amenable
to unionization into their midst, thus decimating membership and
resulting in the loss of long-fought-for gains. This might be so in
cases where, during the absence of the veteran, the plant had become
unionized. Management fears drastic reduction in the efficiency of
their staffs due to the loss of the right to hire and fire, and rapid
turnover of help, if men and women with high seniority are to be
supplanted by men and women with far less experience.
These fears, although they find valid basis in fact, thus far have
turned out to be grossly over-exaggerated. With the war at an end,
hundreds of thousands of soldiers discharged, and thousands more
being discharged daily, a very minute percentage of veterans have
thus far found it necessary to use legal remedies in order to recover
and maintain their jobs. This number does not seem to portend the
weakening of the firm foundations upon which unionization is based.
Nor, thus far, has management suffered from the enforcement of the
veteran's rights.
The courts in each succeeding case have almost uniformly adopt-
ed a pro-veteran interpretation of the Act. This has led to a square
finding for "super-seniority" in the recently decided Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock and Repair Co. case. 9
In Hall v. Union Light, Heat ahd Power Company,'9 the plain-
tiff sued to recover damages in the amount he would have earned
had he been promptly reemployed from the time of application for
such reemployment which was refused. The court found for the
veteran plaintiff and held that the purpose of the statute was to as-
sure the prospective soldiers that their pay and status would be held
inviolate.
8 In the Gold Clause cases, the Supreme Court said: "... contracts
may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter
which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital informity.
Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant consti-
tutional power by making contracts about them... ." Norman v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 307, 310, 79 L. ed. 885 (1935).
9 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp., 62 F. Supp. 25 (E. D.
N. Y. 1945).
10 Hall v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky.
1944).
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The Circuit Court of Appeals in Kay v. General Cable Corp.1
gave judgment to the plaintiff when the defendant corporation sought
to escape liability by claiming that the plaintiff, a physician previ-
ously employed by them, was not in their employ within the meaning
of that term in the Act. They defended too on the ground that their
circumstances had so changed that it would be "unreasonable" to re-
quire them to reemploy the plaintiff.
In the course of interpreting the statute, the court held that, "Of
course, the words 'in the employ of' are not applicable to independent
contractors, but except for casual or temporary workers, who are ex-
pressly excluded, they cover almost any other regular and continuing
service to another." The facts were that the doctor had been em-
ployed at a salary by the company with an office and facilities at the
plant. He nevertheless maintained private offices and patients.
Plaintiff also was physician for an Employees' Health Association
for illness not connected with employment at the plant.
The defendant argued that the Health Association was closely
allied to the plant, and that the Association had neglected to reemploy
the plaintiff and that it was therefore far more efficient to employ
the same physician for both the Association and the plant.
In answering this contention the court found that even if the
reemployment of the veteran might result in additional expense or a
loss in efficiency, the term "unreasonable" has other significance than
"undesirable or inconvenient."
There was a decision against the plaintiff veteran in Wright v.
Weaver Bros., Inc., of Maryland.12  However, the holding merely
declared that where the veteran of his own free will had entered into
a contract with his employer, the law will not allow him to use the
statute to evade obligations and liabilities under his contract. The
contract here stipulated that employment would continue ". . . until
the expiration of six months after delivery of written notice of
termination." The defendant employer had served notice upon the
plaintiff while he was in the service. The dictum in this case is
damaging to the pro-veteran cause because the court said that "the
statute is in derogation of the common law and therefore must be
strictly construed and not extended by implication or by liberal
interpretation."
Recently in a California state court case,13 the employer joined
the union and veteran employee as party defendants in an action for a
declaratory judgment.
"1 Kay v. General Corp., 144 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
12 Wright v. Weaver Bros., Inc., of Maryiand, 56 F. Supp. 595 (D. C. Md.
1945).
13 Harvey Machine Co., Inc. v. Frank Stolo, Aaron Weiselman, Western
Mechanic Local Union No. 700, International Union Mine, Mill and Smelters
Workers C. I. L. C. C. H. Manpower Law Service, par. 60,118 (1945).
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The plaintiff had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the defendant union and the union contended that according to
this agreement the defendant employee did not retain his seniority
rights over employees hired subsequent to the veteran's induction
into the armed forces and that he does not retain his seniority nor
did it accrue by reason of his service in the armed forces. In grant-
ing the declaratory judgment in favor of the veteran employee, the
court found that the Selective Service and Training Act must be
construed in a broad sense, as was the intent of Congress, and that
the primary concern in such a matter as this must be the reinstate-
ment of the veteran in his civilian job, and that other considerations
must be treated as secondary.
In, the Fishgold case,14 the plaintiff, a welder, sought damages
for those days on which he was denied the right to work. The plain-
tiff had been a steady employee before his induction into the army
and upon discharge complied with all the technical requirements of
the statute. He obtained a certificate of satisfactory service, was
qualified to perform the duties of the position and made timely ap-
plication for reinstatement. He was actually reemployed for a time
until it became necessary for the defendant to "shape-up" 15 some
one, and his name was chosen. There were forty-six other welders
and five snappers working on those days and none of these were
veterans. There was a declaratory judgment asked here, too, but
the court denied this because the one-year period had already ex-
pired. The court gave the plaintiff his money judgment and in so
doing held that terms "status" and "pay", unless the employer's cir-
cumstances had been changed so as to make it impossible or un-
reasonable to do so, are merely descriptive words which mean that
the veteran has to be taken back as a first class welder and not a
second class welder and that his pay must remain the same. The
court further indicated that Congress intended that he was to be
entitled to his job over everybody else but a veteran in his own
category and that a returning veteran should have the opportunity
of having one year in which to rehabilitate himself, and one year to
avoid open competition with his fellow employees, due to the fact
that for two, three or four years he was away. There were briefs
filed in the case by the C.I.O. as amicus curiae and by Local 13 of
the International Marine and Shipbuilding Workers Union of
America C.I.O. as intervenor. These briefs earnestly advanced the
14 Supra note 9.
15 "Shape-up" is a term used in industry almost as a synonym for lay-off
to denote a condition in which a slackening of the need for men necessitates
one or more men not working during the slack period. Thus, those laid off
are considered "shaped-up". Men so "shaped-up" nevertheless retain seniority,
vacation and other benefits and need not turn in their tools or badges nor
make a new application for reemployment when the necessity for "shape-up"
ends.
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argument that "shape-up" or lay-off is not in reality a discharge ac-
cording to the meaning of the statute.16 This argument is discounted
as not within the meaning and intent of the statute. Truly, such
an interpretation could lead to fraud and result in nullifying the
statute.
The term "seniority" as used, which according to the defen-
dants' interpretation would allow the veteran seniority for the time
of his service and nothing more, would subject the veteran to
"shape-up" before a non-veteran employee with more seniority. The
court held here that in view of its decision such issue need not be
discussed because the plaintiff need only prove compliance with the
technical requirements of the law in order to establish his prima fade
case and the burden of proving who is senior among veterans and
non-veterans is upon the defendant since it would be an impossibility
for the plaintiff to ascertain this himself.
It seems fortunate that this pro-veteran trend is taking shape.
Congress has acted to spare the ex-serviceman and woman the bitter
disappointments suffered by the veterans of the first World War.
As the law now stands, the numerous conditions with which the
veteran must comply in order to exercise his reemployment rights
will cut down drastically the amount of persons obtaining them. Such
a condition as requires a veteran's position to have been other than
temporary leaves many thousands who were engaged in seasonal
occupations without any remedy.1" The circumstances of the em-
ployer may have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable
to reemploy them. The veteran must also obtain a certificate of
satisfactory service from the armed force in which he served.'
Quere, whether the quality of a person's military service need de-
termine his right to recover and retain his civilian job. There are
many who no longer are qualified to perform their duties because of
injury or disability incurred in service. Others who are physically
fit may not wish to return to their old jobs or if they do so desire,
the job itself may no longer exist due to termination of war con-
tracts or other contingencies. Therefore, with so many who neces-
sarily fall outside the law, the cases seem correctly to extend the
benefits to as many as possible by a liberal pro-veteran construction.
The veteran who has been away from his trade or profession for a
16 Dr. Brecht's arbitration award in Local No. 1, Ind. Union of Marine
and Shipbuilding Workers of America v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., is
quoted, "for a lay-off is not literally a discharge nor when both [employees]
are employed does the retention of the employee who has longer service liter-
ally displace the other employee who, because of lesser seniority, is
properly scheduled for lay-off under the terms [of Collective Bargaining
agreement ... ]."1 7 See GRIFTH, SENIORITY AND REEMPLOYMENT OF WAR VETERAS
(National Industrial Conference Board Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 65)(1944).
38 Excellent treatment given in Note (1942) 17 IND. L. J. 347, 348.
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period of one to four years sorely needs an opportunity to refurbish
his rusty skills and should be assured that for one year he need not
compete in the labor market with those who may have become more
proficient in the course of these years. It is, however, significant to
note that due to an omission by the legislature to account for World
War I veterans, and their widows and dependents, these too can be
supplanted by a veteran of World War II. Simple legislation can
remedy such defect.
SAUL STEPHAN DAVIS.
VARYING ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Two recent cases, in the Federal District Court for the District
of New Jersey were prosecutions for conspiracy. One was for con-
spiracy in restraint of trade,' the second for conspiracy to violate a
regulation or order of the Emergency Price Control Act.2 In one,
the court dealt with the question of reentry into a conspiracy, in the
other, whether conspiracy is a crime apart from the Act sought to
be violated or a crime under such Act. Both cases show that con-
spiracy is not a well defined crime, the essentials of which are uni-
form, but rather one in which they vary somewhat with each charge.
In United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Associationo3
the corporate defendant had participated in agreements for price
schedules which allegedly constituted a conspiracy in restraint of
trade. The corporation later filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
From December 8, 1938 until July 1, 1941, the corporation was in
the custody and control of the court, whose trustee was in exclusive
possession and management. During this time the corporate officers
remained the same but under the control of the court. Throughout
this period the purchase and sale of drug products were continued
at prices in accord with the schedules established under the agree-
ment or alleged conspiracy. On July 1, 1941 the trusteeship was
terminated and the original officers of the defendant corporation were
reinstated. The question was whether upon resumption of legal
control of the business and assets of the defendant corporation by
the same officers and agents, their compliance with the prices previ-
ously established constituted a reentry into the conspiracy.
'United States v. National Wholesale Druggists Association, 61 F. Supp.
590 (D. C. N. J. 1945).2United States v. Schenley Distillers Corporation, 61 F. Supp. 601 (D. C.
N. J. 1945).
3United States v. National Wholesale Druggists Association, 61 F. Supp.
590 (D. C. N. J. 1945), cited supra note 1. %
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